Session 1: Aristotle's Three Kinds of Friendship and the Question of Artificial Companions
Short answer. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes friendships based on usefulness, pleasure and mutual appreciation of character. His framework gives readers three different ways to examine artificial companionship, while leaving open the question of whether a conversational machine can participate in friendship in the fullest sense.
- Aristotle identifies three grounds on which people form friendships: utility, pleasure and virtue.
- A relationship can be valuable without being a complete friendship in Aristotle's sense.
- Mutual goodwill and recognition are central to his account of friendship.
- The distinction between apparent reciprocity and genuine reciprocity is especially important when discussing artificial companions.
The Reading: Aristotle on Friendship
The starting text is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, chapters 2 and 3, with Book IX, chapters 4 and 5 as a useful continuation. These chapters are available in public-domain English translations, including the translation by W. D. Ross. Readers should consult the relevant chapter divisions in their chosen edition because page numbers differ.
Aristotle begins from an ordinary observation: people call many different relationships friendships. He then asks what makes these relationships good and what holds them together. His answer identifies three grounds of affection: usefulness, pleasure and appreciation of the other person's character. The distinctions are not simply three labels for different personalities. They describe different reasons for valuing another person.
- Book VIII, chapter 2: the three kinds of friendship.
- Book VIII, chapter 3: friendship between unequal people.
- Book IX, chapter 4: goodwill and friendship.
- Book IX, chapter 5: friendship and self-love.
Plain Gloss: Three Reasons to Value Another
A friendship of utility exists because each person receives some benefit. Two neighbours might help one another with practical tasks. A friendship of pleasure exists because the people involved enjoy each other's company. Friends who share a hobby, laugh together or enjoy conversation may have this kind of relationship. In both cases, the relationship is connected to something the participants find valuable.
Aristotle describes friendship grounded in virtue as the fullest kind. Here, each person wishes the other well for that person's own sake. The relationship depends on an appreciation of character, not simply on what the other person provides. Aristotle also emphasises mutual goodwill that is recognised by both parties. Wishing someone well privately is different from participating in a friendship in which goodwill is reciprocated.
The three kinds are not necessarily permanent or mutually exclusive. A friendship may involve practical assistance, shared enjoyment and admiration of character. Aristotle's distinctions help identify its foundations, while his discussion of unequal relationships recognises that friendships can take different forms. The fullest kind requires time and familiarity because character cannot be established through a brief encounter.
For artificial companions, the framework produces a useful set of questions. A conversational system might provide information, encouragement or entertainment. These functions resemble elements of utility and pleasure. A more difficult question concerns virtue: can a machine appreciate another person's character, wish that person well for their own sake and reciprocate goodwill? Aristotle's text supplies criteria for discussing this problem, but it does not directly address contemporary software.
What the Framework Can and Cannot Establish
Consider a person who speaks with an artificial companion every evening. The conversation is enjoyable, and the system helps the person organise thoughts after a difficult day. The relationship may have practical and pleasurable value. That description does not settle whether the system is a friend in Aristotle's fullest sense. The classification depends on what counts as genuine mutual goodwill and whether a conversational response can express the relevant kind of concern.
A second distinction concerns the experience of the human participant. Someone may sincerely feel affection, trust or attachment. Those feelings are part of the human side of the relationship, regardless of the philosophical classification given to the other participant. Aristotle's account encourages readers to distinguish the value a relationship has for one person from the reciprocal structure required for a complete friendship.
Five Questions for the Reading Group
Begin with the ordinary examples before moving towards questions about machines. The purpose is to understand Aristotle's distinctions before deciding how far they travel. Each question can be discussed in pairs before the group gathers its different interpretations.
- 1. Which of Aristotle's three kinds of friendship is easiest to recognise in everyday life? Give an example.
- 2. Can a relationship based on usefulness still involve genuine affection? What would make it more than an exchange?
- 3. If an artificial companion makes conversation enjoyable and provides reliable assistance, which of Aristotle's categories best describes the relationship?
- 4. What evidence would be needed to distinguish a machine that expresses goodwill from one that participates in reciprocal goodwill?
- 5. Does Aristotle's account leave room for a meaningful relationship in which only one participant can experience friendship?
Counter-Reading: Montaigne on Friendship
For a contrasting perspective, read Michel de Montaigne's essay Of Friendship, in Book I, chapter 28 of the Essays. Montaigne reflects on his friendship with Étienne de La Boétie and describes a closeness that he finds difficult to divide into ordinary categories of exchange. His account is more personal and literary than Aristotle's systematic classification.
The comparison opens a further question: are friendship's defining qualities best understood through a general account of its forms, or through the particular experience of knowing another person? Readers can also consider Martin Buber's I and Thou, especially Part I, as a later philosophical perspective on meeting another as a subject. Its account of relation raises questions about whether conversational responsiveness alone amounts to genuine encounter.
Facilitator Sheet: A Sixty-Minute Conversation
A group of four to eight people can use the following agenda. Participants need the selected Aristotle chapters, paper and a clock. No specialist vocabulary is required. The facilitator should invite examples while keeping distinctions between the text, personal experience and speculation visible.
- 0-5 minutes: Welcome participants and ask each person to name one quality they associate with friendship.
- 5-15 minutes: Read the relevant passages from Book VIII, chapters 2 and 3.
- 15-25 minutes: Ask participants to explain utility, pleasure and virtue in their own words.
- 25-40 minutes: Discuss questions 1 to 3, recording examples without classifying anyone's personal relationships.
- 40-52 minutes: Discuss questions 4 and 5, allowing disagreement about reciprocity and goodwill.
- 52-60 minutes: Invite each participant to identify one unresolved question and suggest a passage for further reading.
Questions readers ask
What is the difference between goodwill and friendship in Aristotle?
Goodwill can exist without an established relationship. Friendship requires a recognised and sustained form of mutual affection, with each participant aware of the other's goodwill.
Why does Aristotle think complete friendship takes time?
Character becomes clearer through repeated actions and shared circumstances. A person needs time to understand whether another's qualities are stable enough to support lasting friendship.
Can artificial companionship fit the utility category?
That is a reasonable starting classification when the relationship is valued for assistance, information or convenience. The discussion becomes more complicated when enjoyment, attachment and expectations of reciprocity are added.
Which other texts belong on an introductory AI companionship reading list?
Turing's Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Weizenbaum's Computer Power and Human Reason, and Sherry Turkle's Alone Together offer different entry points into questions about imitation, human attachment and technological relationships.